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LOCAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL RESPONSES FOR MEDICAL
MANAGEMENT OF A RADIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR INCIDENT
Nicholas Dainiak, MD, FACP and Beata Skudlarska, MD  Department of
Medicine, Bridgeport Hospital and Yale School of Medicine
Joseph Albanese, PhD  Center for Emergency Preparedness and Disaster
Response, Yale New Haven Health
 Radiological and nuclear devices may be used by terrorists or may be the source of
accidental exposure. A tiered approach has been recommended for response to a terror-
ist event wherein local, regional, state and federal assets become involved sequentially, as
the magnitude in severity of the incident increases. State-wide hospital plans have been
developed and published for Connecticut, New York and California. These plans address
delineation of responsibilities of various categories of health professionals, protection of
healthcare providers, identification and classification of individuals who might have been
exposed to and/or contaminated by radiation and, in the case of Connecticut response
plan, early management of victims. Regional response programs such as the New England
Regional Health Compact (consisting of 6 member states) have been developed to man-
age consequences of radiation injury. The Department of Homeland Security is ultimate-
ly responsible for managing both health consequences and the crisis. Multiple US nation-
al response assets may be called upon for use in radiological incidents. These include
agencies and programs that have been developed by the Department of Energy, the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Defense. Coordination of
national, regional and state assets with local response efforts is necessary to provide a time-
ly and efficient response.
INTRODUCTION
Exposure to moderate or high-dose ionizing radiation may occur fol-
lowing an accident or an intentional act. Registries of radiation accidents
indicate that exposure to radiation predominately involves sealed
sources, x-ray devices, accelerators and diagnostic and therapeutic
radioisotopes (Ricks 2002; Dainiak and Ricks 2005). Terrorist acts may
involve the use of a sealed source, radiological dispersal device (i.e., dirty
bomb) or improvised nuclear device, or may involve an attack on a
nuclear power plant, transportation vehicle, nuclear stockpile or waste
storage site (NCRP 2001; Waselenko et al. 2004).
Intentional exposure to radiation is increasingly recognized as a dis-
tinct possibility, as the threat from terrorist activities has been realized fol-
lowing the September 11, 2001 terrorist act in New York City. Radiation is
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a potentially good option for terrorists, as the general public, news media,
early responders and healthcare providers often have misunderstandings
and/or an exaggerated fear of radiation. Radiation detection and meas-
urement require special expertise. Since the terrorist’s primary objective
is to create fear and panic in a large number of people in order to focus
attention on a cause and/or satisfy a demand, radiation is particularly
attractive. Confusion between estimates of dose vs. dose rate, lack of
knowledge of radiation units of measurement, and misunderstanding of
dose-related biological effects, contribute to achieving this objective.
The major goals of a response to a radiological emergency are to pro-
tect the public and to protect emergency personnel during the response
(IAEA 2006). To achieve these goals, local, regional and national assets
may be brought together to address an incident of national significance.
Here, the concept of a layered response strategy is reviewed as a function
of the magnitude of a radiological event. Also discussed are the roles of
resources controlled by the Department of Energy (DOE),
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Defense
(DOD) as a function of time after an incident has occurred.
LOCAL AND STATE RESPONSE
The magnitude and severity of a nuclear/radiological incident deter-
mines the type and degree of response. A tiered approach involves
sequential activation of local, regional, state and federal resources, as the
size of the incident increases (Stangler 2004). Figure 1 provides an
overview of early sequential involvement of various agencies whose objec-
tives are to address public health effects (i.e., consequence management)
and causes of a terrorist act (i.e., crisis management). Among the earliest
responders are members of the hazardous materials (HAZMAT) team,
including the local police and fire departments and emergency medical
services (Dainiak et al. 2007).
Members of the state Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) may also respond as part of the HAZMAT team, providing on site
radiological surveys and advice to the incident commander regarding the
need to involve additional resources. For example, the New England
Regional Health Compact (NERHC) may be called upon to provide addi-
tional manpower for assessing an incident occurring in Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont or Maine.
Radiation drills are conducted in order to achieve rapid response from
neighboring states. Other regions of the country may have a similar
arrangement with neighboring states.
Victims are triaged in the field and assessed for medical condition
and contamination. If medically stable, victims should be decontaminat-
ed on site and relocated upwind or transported to a hospital, depending
upon medical needs. Many of these individuals may require follow-up in
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an ambulatory treatment center or other outpatient setting for a minor
injury, neuropsychiatic assessment or a behavioral disorder. If medically
unstable, victims are stabilized and immediately transported to a hospital
where definitive medical care is provided. Decontamination is performed
after medical stabilization has been achieved.
Healthcare facilities are required to develop medical response plans as
part of their disaster planning effort (JCAHCO 2005). State-wide hospital
plans have been developed for addressing radiologic emergencies for
states, including Connecticut (Dainiak et al. 2006), California (Bushberg
2007), and New York (DOHMH 2007). Mass casualty disaster drills involv-
ing radiologic materials are being planned and conducted at increasing
frequency (Schleipman et al. 2004; Albanese et al. 2007; Wilkinson et al.
2007). Surge capacity for biodosimetry laboratories has been recently
addressed as well (Albanese et al. 2007; Wilkinson et al. 2007).
Recommendations of the Connecticut plan include delineation of respon-
Response to a Radiological/Nuclear Incident
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FIGURE 1. Initial response to a radiologic incident. Among those arriving at the scene of a radio-
logical incident are members of the Hazards Materials (HAZMAT) Team, including first responders,
and fire and police personnel. In some states such as Connecticut, members of the Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) are part of the first-responder team. DEP personnel have the train-
ing and expertise to conduct and interpret radiological surveys. The incident commander in the field
may request additional help from the New England Regional Health Compact (NERHC) for state
members of this compact. Help may also be requested from the Department of Energy (DOE),
including its Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), to manage public health consequences, as well
as from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to manage causes of the crisis. Activities of all agen-
cies are coordinated through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Victims are triaged in
the field where they are decontaminated, if medically stable. Medically unstable individuals are
immediately transported to an area hospital where the Emergency Department Staff responds,
together with individuals who are familiar with radiation measurements and medical and surgical
subspecialists. Reproduced from Dainiak et al. (7). 
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sibilities of different categories of healthcare professionals involved in the
response, protection of healthcare providers, identification and classifica-
tion of victims, and early management of individuals who have had or
might have had a radiologic exposure (Dainiak et al. 2006). Resuscitation
and medical stabilization of the patient with definitive treatment of serious
injuries takes precedence over decontamination of the skin, treatment of
minor injuries and containment of the treatment area (NCRP 2001;
Dainiak et al. 2006). Clinicians must wear appropriate protective clothing
(i.e. gown, gloves, masks, eye protection, and head and shoe covers).
Depending on the nature of the injuries, it may be necessary to have eval-
uations performed by subspecialists, including a hematologist, burn physi-
cian, trauma surgeon, intensivist and/or dermatologist.
Following medical stabilization, the patient is classified based on pres-
ence or absence of physical injury, exposure and/or contamination
(Dainiak et al. 2006). Decontamination may be performed by removal of
clothing (resulting in approximately 90% decontamination) and shower-
ing (resulting in removal of approximately 90% of the remaining con-
tamination). The use of soap and shampoo facilitates decontamination of
the skin and hair. Patients are triaged to the OR, routine care floor, criti-
cal care area or ambulatory setting for treatment and/or monitoring
(Dainiak et al. 2006). If surgery is required, it should be performed with-
in 36-48 hours after exposure (NCRP 2001). This time window is critical
since significant exposures will result in leukopenia and immune suppres-
sion, thereby predisposing patients to infection. Laboratory monitoring
includes obtaining a complete blood count (with a focus on the absolute
lymphocyte count, polymorphonuclear cell count and platelet count),
obtaining a peripheral blood sample for cytogenetics testing and consider-
ation of internal contamination (Waselenko et al. 2004). The rate of
decline in absolute lymphocyte count correlates with whole-body estimated
dose and overall prognosis (Flynn and Goans 2006). Assessment for chro-
mosomal aberrations (i.e., ring forms and dicentrics) is the “gold standard”
of individual biodosimetry. A recent comparative study in five laboratories
confirmed the validity and accuracy of the dicentric chromosome assay
(Wilkins et al. 2008). Chromosome analysis may be performed urgently or
at a later period of time, depending on the needs and circumstances of the
situation. Assessment of prognosis and clinical decision making are based
upon radiation dose estimates and the presence of certain clinical signs
and symptoms, such as time to onset of nausea and vomiting, rate of
decline in absolute lymphocyte count, cutaneous lesions and neurovascular
changes, including hypotension, tachycardia, fever and neurological and
cognitive deficits (Dainiak et al. 2011a; Dainiak et al. 2011b).
Special decontamination areas include localized skin contamination,
contamination of the eyes and wound contamination. Patients with
wound contamination must be considered to have internal contamina-
N. Dainiak and others
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tion (DOHMH 2007). Radioactive (i.e. hot) particles should be removed
with a long forceps. Internal decontamination should be considered
when an individual may have inhaled, ingested or injected radioactive
material. Assessment for internal contamination is a complex process that
requires specialized expertise (NCRP 1980). Internal decontamination
with blocking or diluting agents, chelating agents and other specific
agents (for example, Prussian blue) should be considered after consulta-
tion with professionals who are familiar with their use in radiation victims.
FEDERAL ASSETS
Activation of a federal response may be triggered by a state or lead
federal agency. The Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters is noti-
fied, and together with the DOE/Nevada Site Office and the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Regional Coordinating Office,
a decision will be made regarding activation of the Federal Radiological
Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). While FRMAC is involved
in the emergency response, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is involved predominately in the recovery phase of an incident. This
Response to a Radiological/Nuclear Incident
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FIGURE 2. Activation of radiation response assets. A state or lead federal agency may request DOE
Headquarters to respond to a radiologic incident. A decision to respond will be made in consultation
with the Nevada Site Office and the NNSA Regional Office. During the emergency phase of a
response, FRMAC assets are activated. During phase 1 of the emergency phase, on-site help is expect-
ed within approximately 4-8 hours. FRMAC should be activated within 24-36 hours, and operational
approximately 24 hours thereafter. The EPA is involved in the recovery phase of the response. 
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sequence of activating a radiation response at the federal level is dia-
gramed in Figure 2.
Details of national response assets for radiological incidents are
reviewed in a recent publication by Remick and colleagues (Remick et al.
2005). During the phase I of an emergency response (the initial 4-8
hours), the Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT) is acti-
vated. During the initial 24-36 hours (phase II), the CMRT response ini-
tiates 24 hour operations. The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) is
a DOE resource that may be activated for monitoring operations and pro-
vision of additional support personnel to enhance radiologic assessment,
health and safety issues, and logistics (Remick et al. 2005). RAP regional
offices are located in Washington, D.C., Upton, Long Island, NY, Oak
Ridge, TN, Aiken, SC, Albuquerque, NM, Argomne, IL, Idaho Falls, ID,
Oakland, CA and Richland, WA (NCRP 2001; Stangler 2004; Remick et al.
N. Dainiak and others
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FIGURE 3. Local and national emergency response. The local response (green) includes activation
of HAZMAT units and Civil Support Teams (CSTs). It is coordinated by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). The national response provides resources to conduct radiation measure-
ments on samples of air, soil and foliage. DOE response (dark blue) includes activation of the Aerial
Measuring System (AMS), the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) and the
Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT). The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)
and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) are deployable DOE
resources that may provide personnel to assist in mitigating an event. EPA assets (gray) include two
mobile laboratories (the Radiation and Indoor Environment National Laboratory or RIENL, and the
National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory or NAREL) that provide expertise and equip-
ment for sample preparation. The Department of Defense may elect to engage in the response
(black) through activation of its Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT), the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). It may be elected
to also assign a Joint Field Office (JFO) as a point of contact for the DOD. 
NIRF: Nuclear Incident Response Force. FLARE: Field Laboratory for Assessment of Radiation
Exposure Team. RAT: Radioanalytical Team. HOSP: hospital. 
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2005). The regional office closest to the radiological incident may or may
not be involved in the response.
Figure 3 provides a overview of response efforts by the DOE, EPA and
Department of Defense (DOD). Sampling of air, soil and foliage may be
made by several DOE assets, including the CMRT, the Ariel Measuring
System (AMS) and the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
(NARAC). A three-dimensional model for particle movement is used to
calculate real-time estimates of transport and dispersion of radioactive
material, using current patterns of weather and assessment of terrain.
DOE assets also include the Radiation Emergency Assistance
Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) located in Oak Ridge, TN. REAC/TS
provides around the clock medical consultants for both clinical and
health physics issues. In addition to having clinicians, health physicists
and radiobiologists, REAC/TS has the capacity to measure radioactivity
using radiological, biological and cytogenetic methods. Its staff is avail-
able for triage, external and internal decontamination, prognostic assess-
ments and radiation dose assessment. REAC/TS also offers radiation acci-
dent training classes for national and foreign medical, paramedical and
health physics professionals. Training courses may be requested by pro-
fessional groups (Dainiak et al. 2006).
The EPA may employ several assets to provide expertise in equipment
for dealing with sample preparation (see Figure 3). This includes the
Radiation and Indoor Environment National Laboratory (RIENL) locat-
ed in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the National Air and Radiation
Environment Laboratory (NAREL) (Remick et al. 2005). These laborato-
ries provide expertise in equipment to prepare samples. They also pro-
vide a mobile command post with satellite communications. Both labora-
tories provide sample survey kits and air samplers, as well as pop-up tents
and cargo trailers.
A system of Nuclear Emergency Support Team has been developed to
deal with search and identification of nuclear materials and nuclear
devices. This includes the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST),
Search Response Team (SRT) and Search Augmentation Team (SAT). In
addition, the Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT) may be
deployed for overseas incidents. Civil support teams are organized as 22-
member units of the full-time National Guard. These units have a spe-
cialized expertise in communications and technical training in radiologi-
cal, chemical and biologic incidents.
The National Response Plan (NRP) establishes a strategy for coordi-
nating the national response to a significant incident. Its agencies include
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA. Response from
the DOD is made after a request for assistance has been made. Depending
on the legality, lethality risk and appropriateness of the incident, the
Secretary of Defense may delegate a unified combatant commander.
Response to a Radiological/Nuclear Incident
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As shown in Figure 3, a Joint Field Office (JFO) may be established
and agencies may be mobilized, including the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA), the Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT)
and the Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). AFRAT deploys
in an effort to provide radiological risk assessment and site recovery.
Teams include the Nuclear Incident Response Force (NIRF), the Field
Laboratory for Assessment of Radiation Exposure (FLARE) and the
Radioanalytical Team (RAT).
CONCLUSION
Response to a significant radiological incident is based upon a layered
strategy wherein local, state, regional and national resources are
deployed. The degree to which various agencies are activated depends on
the magnitude of the radiological event. Roles have been determined for
the DOE, EPA and DOE in responding to a nuclear incident.
Coordination of a multitude of local and national agencies is critical for
a timely, efficient response and for achieving optimal outcomes for vic-
tims of an incident.
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